game). They are contacted individually and are asked to choose between two choices (strategies): to confess (D) and not to confess (C), where C and D stand for Cooperation and Defection and this well-known wording of their available choices refers to the fellow prisoner and not to the authorities.
The rules state that if neither prisoner confesses, i.e. (C, C), both are given freedom; when one prisoner confesses (D) and the other does not (C), i.e. (C, D) or (D, C), the prisoner who confesses gets freedom as well as financial reward, while the prisoner who did not confess ends up in the prison for a longer term. When both prisoners confess, i.e. (D, D), both are given a reduced term.
In two-player case the strategy pair (D, D) comes out as the unique NE (and the rational outcome) of the game, leading to the situation of both having reduced term. The game offers a dilemma as the rational outcome (D, D) differs from the outcome (C, C), which is an available choice, and for which both prisoners get freedom.
The three-player PD is defined by making the association:
and afterwards imposing the following conditions [54] : a) The strategy S 2 is a dominant choice [1] for each player. For Alice this requires:
and similar inequalities hold for players Bob and Charles. b) A player is better off if more of his opponents choose to cooperate. For Alice this requires: and similar relations hold for Bob and Charles.
Translating the above conditions while using the notation introduced in (5) requires:
which define a generalized three-player PD. For example [54] , all of these conditions hold by letting α = 7, β = 9, δ = 3, ǫ = 0, ω = 1, θ = 5 all of these conditions hold.
3 Playing three-player games using coins
Consider the situation when three players share a probabilistic system to play the three-player symmetric game defined in the Section (2). For this system, in a run, a player has to choose one out of two choices and, in either case, the outcome (of some measurement, or observation, which follows after players have made their choices) is either +1 or −1.
When we associate +1 to the head and −1 to the tail of a coin, sharing coins (not necessarily unbiased) can provide a possible physical realization of a probabilistic physical system. In the following we consider two setups, both of which use coins in order to play the symmetric threeplayer game (5) . It is found that the later setup provides the appropriate arrangement to introduce joint probabilities (associated to an EPR setting involving three observers) to the playing of a three-player game.
In the standard EPR setting, in a run, each one of the spatially-separated observers makes one of two measurements, the outcome of which, for either of the two measurements, is either +1 or −1.
Three-coin setup
The most natural scenario for playing a three-player game, when they share a probabilistic physical system of three coins, is the one when in a run each player is given a coin in a 'head up' state, and 'to flip' or to 'not to flip' are the player's available strategies. We denote Alice's, Bob's, and Charles' strategy 'to flip' by S 1 , S ′ 1 , and S ′′ 1 , respectively, and likewise, we denote Alice's, Bob's, and Charles' strategy 'not to flip' by S 2 , S ′ 2 , and S ′′ 2 , respectively. The three coins are then passed to a referee who rewards players after observing the state of the three coins.
In repeated runs, the players Alice, Bob, and Charles can play mixed strategies denoted by x, y, z ∈ [0, 1], respectively. Here x, y, z are the probabilities to choose S 1 (out of S 1 and S 2 ), S 
In the following we will use "NE" when we refer to either a Nash equilibrium or to Nash equilibria, as determined by the context. We call this arrangement, which uses three coins to play a threeplayer game, the three-coin setup.
Six-coin setup
The three-player game (5) can also be played using six coins (not necessarily unbiased) instead of the three. Two coins are assigned to each player before the game begins. In a run each player chooses one out of the two, which defines his/her strategy in the run. Three coins are, therefore, chosen in a run. The three chosen coins are passed to a referee who tosses them together and observes the outcome. Many such outcomes are observed as the process of receiving, choosing, and subsequently tossing the chosen coins is repeated many times.
After many runs, the referee rewards the players according to their strategies (i.e. which coin(s) they have had chosen over many runs), the outcomes of several tosses giving rise to the underlying statistics of the coins and from the six coefficients defining the three-player symmetric game defined in Section (2) .
Notice that coins are tossed in each run, which makes playing of a game inherently probabilistic both in content and character, thus paving the way to step into the quantum regime and to introduce quantum probabilities.
We call this arrangement of using six coins for playing a three-player game the six-coin setup. Why introduce a six-coin setup when a three-player game can also be played in three-coin setup? The answer is provided by the EPR setting that involves three observers and 64 joint probabilities. The six coin setup allows us to translate the playing of a three-player game in terms of 64 joint probabilities. When these joint probabilities are quantum mechanical (and are obtained from an EPR setting involving three observers) they may have the unusual character of being nonfactorizable. That is, the six-coin setup serves as an intermediate step allowing us to see the impact of non-factorizable quantum probabilities on the solution of a game.
In the six-coin setup, a player plays a pure strategy 1 when s/he chooses the same coin over all the runs and s/he plays a mixed strategy when s/he chooses his/her first coin with some probability over the runs.
Notice that, by its construction, this setup requires a large number of runs to play a game irrespective of whether players play pure strategies or mixed strategies, as in either case players' rewards depend on outcomes of many tosses.
We denote Alice's two coins by S 1 , S 2 ; Bob's two coins by S . The head of a coin is associated (as it is in the three-coin setup) to +1 and its tail to −1, and we denote the outcome of Alice's, Bob's, and Charles' coins as π A , π B , and π C , respectively.
Alice's outcome of π A = +1 or −1, whether she goes for the S 1 -coin or the S 2 -coin in a run, is independent from Bob's outcome of π B = +1 or −1 as well as whether he goes for the S ′ 1 -coin or the S ′ 2 -coin in the same run. Also, both of these outcomes are independent of Charles' outcome of π C = +1 or −1 as well as whether he goes for the S ′′ 1 -coin or the S ′′ 2 -coin in the same run. The associated probabilities are, therefore, factorizable in the sense that the probability for triplet of outcomes can be expressed as the product of probability for each outcome separately. Mathematically, this is expressed by writing joint probabilities as the arithmetic product of their respective marginals, i.e.
where, for example, Bob can set S . Namely, r is the probability of getting head for (Alice's) S 1 -coin; r ′ is the probability of getting head for (Bob's) S ′ 1 -coin; and r ′′ is the probability of getting head for (Charles') S ). Namely, s is the probability of getting head for (Alice's) S 2 -coin; s ′ is the probability of getting head for (Bob's) S ′ 2 -coin; and s ′′ is the probability of getting head for (Charles') S ′′ 2 -coin. Factorizability, then, for example, allows us to write Pr(+1, −1, −1;
Payoff relations and the Nash equilibria
Given how we have defined a 'pure strategy' in the six-coin setup the players' pure-strategy payoff relations can now be written as
where, on right side of each equation, the three constants in brackets correspond to the players Alice, Bob, and Charles respectively. We take that Eqs. A mixed-strategy game, in the six-coin setup, corresponds to when, over repeated runs of the game, the player(s) choose one of their coin(s) with some probability. Let x, y, and z be the probabilities with which Alice, Bob, and Charles, respectively, choose the coins S 1 , S ′ 1 , and S ′′ 1 , respectively. The players' six-coin mixed-strategy payoff relations then read,
Notice that the right side of Eq. (22) contains expressions that are given by Eqs. (14-21) .
Six-coin mixed-strategy payoff relations (22) are mathematically identical to the three-coin mixed-strategy payoff relations (2). However, these equations are to be interpreted differently as the definitions of a strategy in three-and six-coin setups are different. In (2) the numbers x, y, and z are the probabilities with which Alice, Bob, and Charles, respectively, flip the coin that s/he receives. Whereas in (22) the numbers x, y, and z are the probabilities with which, over repeated runs, Alice, Bob, and Charles select the S 1 -coin, the S
With these definitions the payoff relations (14-21) are re-expressed as 
Now, from the definitions (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) , requiring coins to satisfy the constraint (s, s ′ , s ′′ ) = (0, 0, 0) makes a number of the joint probabilities vanish: (42) which, in turn, reduces the pure-strategy payoff relations (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) to
where only those joint probabilities are left that can have non-zero value(s). These (pure strategy) payoff relations ensure that when the joint probabilities (involved in these expressions) become factorizable the classical outcome of the game results.
Three-player quantum games
In the quantum game literature [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] 26, 27, 29] , three-player games have attracted relatively less attention as compared to the two-player games as their analysis is often found to be significantly harder even in the classical regime. However, as mentioned in Section 1, an interesting example of a three-player quantum game was discussed by Vaidman [11, 12] that describes the GHZ paradox [10] as a game among three players.
Vaidman's game is a purpose-built, specially-designed, or an invented game in which the winning conditions are tailored in order to ensure that a team of three players having access to GHZ state will win the game always.
Probabilistic analysis of Vaidman's game, in view of the context of the present paper, one notices that it can be won always by a team of three quantum players having access to a probabilistic physical system for which joint probabilities are non-factorizable, in a particular way that is described by the winning conditions of the game. These conditions are such that a set of nonfactorizable joint probabilities generated by a GHZ state can result in the team always winning the game.
Although the Vaidman's game demonstrates how a GHZ state can be helpful in winning a game, by itself this game does not propose a quantization procedure for a general three-player noncooperative game. This was achieved by Benjamin and Hayden [17] who developed a multiplayer extension of Eisert et al.'s quantization scheme [16] , originally proposed for two-player noncooperative games. Eisert et al.'s scheme is widely considered to have led to the birth of the area of quantum games.
The interesting situation, however, which the Vaidman's game presents certainly motivates one to ask what may happen to a generalized three-player noncooperative symmetric quantum game, when the players share a probabilistic system for which joint probabilities are not factorizable. This is precisely the question that we aim to address in this paper.
Three-player quantum games using EPR setting
We consider a standard EPR setting for three spatially-separated observers and use it to play a general three-player symmetric noncooperative game. In this setting the three observers are the players Alice, Bob, and Charles whose locations are spatially distant and are not able to communicate among themselves.
In a run, each player receives a particle on which s/he can make one of two measurements, the outcome of each of which is either +1 or −1. We assume that the two possible measurements, for each player, correspond to her/him choosing between two directions of measurement.
Instead of coins, we let S 1 and S 2 be Alice's two directions of measurement. Similarly, we let S In a run each one of the three players chooses one of his/her two directions and informs his/her choice to a referee. The referee, after knowing which three directions the three players have chosen in that run, rotates his/her Stern-Gerlach type apparatus along the three chosen directions and performs a quantum measurement. The outcome of measurement in each of these three chosen directions is either +1 or −1.
The runs are repeated as players make choices in each run and outcome of the measurements are recorded. The arrangement is comparable to the six-coin setup, when for each player the two available directions, in a run, refer to choosing between two coins, and the outcome of a quantum measurement corresponds to the outcome of a toss which involves three coins.
Notice that when the standard EPR setting (involving three observers) is used to play a three-player game, the players' strategies are exactly the same as they are in the case when they play classical strategies using coins. Over repeated runs, each player can either choose the same direction or s/he can choose one direction with some probability.
This definition of a strategy serves three purposes: a) it allows using the standard EPR setup (involving three observers) for playing a three-player game, b) it appears to avoid the argument [55] stating that allowing players extended sets of actions, in a quantum game setup, can be equated to extending their sets of pure strategies in the classical game, c) it gives ground to the expectation that the peculiar non-factorizable quantum mechanical probabilities, which emerge in EPR setting, might have implications for the outcome(s) of a game.
Using this convention and noticing the notation for 64 six-coin joint probabilities in (26-33) convinces one to introduce the same notation for 64 joint probabilities corresponding to the EPR setting, which involves three observers: The same holds true for the remaining coin probabilities (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) as they satisfy the remaining equations in (52) .
Along with the constraints that normalization imposes on joint probabilities, there are other constraints that are imposed by requirements of causal communication. Often these constraints are referred [50] to as the condition of 'parameter independence', 'simple locality', 'signal locality', or 'physical locality'. Essentially, they say, for example, that the probability Pr A (+1; S 1 ) of Alice obtaining the outcome +1 when she plays S 1 is not changed by Bob's choice for S . That is, the probability of a particular measurement outcome on one part of the system is independent of which measurement is performed on the other part(s) [50] . Causal communication constraints make it impossible for the participating agents to acausually exchange the classical information. 
